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1. Introduction
Symmetries are widespread in physical theories, so the question of their physical content
naturally arises. Traditional responses, appealing for example to the hole argument or to the gauge
argument, tend to interpret theoretical symmetries as a mathematical surplus or a heuristic tool, or at
best as accounting for points of view of different observers. Direct empirical status (DES) provides
a  new look  on  the  question.  DES is  a  status  that  a  theoretical  symmetry  has  in  virtue  of  its
correspondence to an empirical symmetry. In this context the theoretical symmetry transformation
and the theoretical elements which vary under it have a correspondence in the world. But does this
correspondence concern the observable features alone ('the observational DES') or the unobservable
features as well ('the ontological DES')? Responding to this question would show to what extent
theoretical symmetries can be ontologically significant, and the present article aims at helping to
determine the answer.
So far DES has been addressed (to my knowledge) in Kosso ([2000]), Brading and Brown
([2004]), Healey ([2009]), Greaves and Wallace ([2014]), Friederich ([2015]), Teh ([2016]), and
Ladyman and Presnell ([in submission])1. Despite the progress brought about by these articles, they
contain  a  number  of  drawbacks:  empirical  symmetries  are  only  given  through  examples;  the
observational and the ontological DES are often conflated; it is mostly held that only global but not
local  theoretical  symmetries  have  the  ontological  DES;  the  empirical  approach  to  DES  is
* This is a de-anonymised version of the text which got a 2nd place in the 2018 competition for the Young Researchers
Prize of the Société de Philosophie des Sciences (SPS). Submitted for the competition on 1 March 2018.
1 The notions of direct empirical significance and direct empirical consequences have also been used in this literature.
I concentrate on the more general  and less charged notion of direct  empirical status whose name derives from
Kosso's ([2000]) original vocabulary and whose varieties I define below.
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underestimated;  gauge  symmetries  are  deemed  irrelevant  to  the  analysis  of  DES.  The  present
article, by contrast, presents a generalised notion of empirical symmetry, consistently distinguishes
the two DESs, shows that local symmetries are able to have the ontological DES, and illustrates the
usefulness of gauge symmetries and of the empirical approach to the analysis of DES.
Section 2 explains what empirical symmetries are, and Section 3 when they are identifiable.
Section 3 also defines the identifiable observational DES and the identifiable ontological DES and
explains why gauge symmetries do not have them. Section 4 explains which theoretical symmetries
have the  identifiable  observational  DES.  Sections  5-6 discuss  global  and local  symmetries  and
motivations for thinking that only global symmetries have the identifiable ontological DES. Section
7 exhibits local symmetries with the identifiable observational DES, explains why these symmetries
can also have the identifiable ontological DES, and shows how gauge symmetries are useful in this
context. Section 8 is a conclusion.
2. Empirical symmetries
For Kosso ([2000]) an empirical symmetry is a phenomenon exhibiting some observable
difference and some observable invariance under a transformation. For instance, in Galileo's ship
empirical symmetry mechanical experiments performed within a ship look the same from within a
ship which stands still with respect to the shore and from within a ship which moves uniformly with
respect to it. However, the four recognised empirical symmetries found so far have much more in
common than what Kosso was highlighting. I will encompass this in the notion of generic empirical
symmetry below.
The following vocabulary  will  be  used.  A physical  feature is  any monadic or  relational
generic physical property (which can be instantiated by several systems or is an abstraction of such
instantiations).  A physical system is a part of the world sufficiently autonomous for our purposes.
A(n extended) physical state of a physical system relative to a period of time is a collection of
physical features which the system or its parts possess at one, some or all moments within this
period of time. A (conservative) physical transformation is a transformation between physical states
which preserves the identity of a  physical system.  A dynamics is  a change in time of physical
features  of  a  system or  its  parts  which  either  originates  in  the  system or  is  induced  but  not
immediately  caused by an  external  intervention  (e.g. as  when the  intervention  only  consists  in
setting the initial conditions).
In this framework I propose to describe a generic empirical symmetry as constituted by two
physical states of a physical system such that one (the initial state) can be physically transformed
into the other (the final state) and such that these states exhibit the (dynamical) constitutive features.
The latter are firstly the identical features, namely the dynamics (for macroscopic systems) or the
results  of  dynamics  (for  microscopic  systems)  identical  for  the  two  states  and  such  that  the
dynamics is interior to the system in question, and secondly the constitutive differences, i.e. features
which cannot be instantiated by the same physical system simultaneously, are different for the two
states, and consist in or induce some dynamics between that system and exterior objects which form
a larger system together. Additionally, each of the constitutive differences should persist throughout
the time during which the interior dynamics unfolds (the relevance condition) and there should exist
constitutive differences which are similar to those constituting the empirical symmetry but which
cannot be instantiated with the same identical features (the non-triviality condition).
A two-state empirical symmetry just described corresponds to a particular realisation of a
recognised  empirical  symmetry  (e.g. a  particular  pace  of  relative  displacement  between  two
Galileo's ships and a particular mechanical experiment within each ship). A recognised empirical
symmetry itself is a class of such realisations defined by the fact for their constitutive features to be
of specific kinds, such as those shown in Table 1. I will be concentrating on particular two-state
empirical symmetries rather than on their classes in what follows.
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Recognised empirical 
symmetry
Galileo's ship Einstein's elevator Faraday's cage 't Hooft's beam-splitter
Scale Macroscopic Microscopic or 
macroscopic2
System Ship Elevator Cage Beam3
Identical features Interior dynamics4 Interference pattern 
resulting from a 
dynamicsmechanical inertial electromagnetic
Constitutive 
differences
compatible with the 
invariance
Some / no5 uniform 
rectilinear 
displacement
Some / no friction
A neighbouring mass, 
no working engine / 
No neighbouring 
mass, a working 
engine
Some / no sparkles on 
the outer boundaries
Two / no half-wave 
plates
A half-wave plate and 
a solenoid with a 
current inside / None
incompatible with the 
invariance
Some / no accelerated 
displacement
Some / no curvilinear 
displacement
A neighbouring mass, 
no working engine / A
neighbouring mass, a 
working engine
To be determined Two half-wave plates 
with / without a 
solenoid with a current
inside
The condition above that it be possible to link two states constituting a given (realisation of
an) empirical symmetry by a physical transformation is compatible with the states not being linked
by  a  physical  transformation  in  some  instances  of  this  empirical  symmetry.  Thus  in  different
instances of an empirical symmetry the two states can belong to the same or to distinct system(s),
which constitutes respectively  the first and  the second way of instantiating empirical symmetries.
The equivalence of these ways was stated but not motivated by Brading and Brown ([2004], p. 647,
n. 5). One simple motivation I can propose is  that distinct systems can instantiate an empirical
symmetry via the first way, so the identity of systems seems irrelevant to instantiating any of the
states constituting an empirical symmetry (unless when the constitutive differences are essential)
and thus the second way seems as much acceptable as the first.
3. Identifiability
DES  can  be  established  in  two  ways.  In  the  theoretical  approach,  one  starts  with  a
theoretical symmetry and asks which empirical symmetry adequately instantiates it (e.g. Greaves
and Wallace [2014]). In the  empirical approach, one starts with an empirical symmetry and asks
which theoretical symmetry adequately represents it (e.g. Healey [2009]). If the matching empirical
or theoretical symmetry is found, the relevant theoretical symmetry is said to have DES.
At least in the empirical approach a pre-requisite for establishing a DES is that an empirical
symmetry  be  identifiable,  i.e. that  it  be  possible  to  detect  it  in  the  world.  Arguably  empirical
symmetries can be detected most straightforwardly if their constitutive features are observable. If
they  are  not,  one  could  try  to  claim that  a  phenomenon is  an  empirical  symmetry  (or  that  an
empirical  symmetry exists)  because a theory says so.  But this  requires presupposing that  some
2 Respectively in ('t Hooft [1980]) and (Naeij and Shafiee [2016]). Note that the name and page numbers of the 't
Hooft's article do not seem to be cited correctly in Brading and Brown ([2004]) and Greaves and Wallace ([2014]).
3 Not one of the two parts the beam is split into as in Greaves and Wallace ([2014]). This takes into account objections
to the latter position (Greaves and Wallace [2014], p. 83, n. 24).
4 E.g. falling balls,  bending light,  burning candles;  for  other  examples for Galileo's  ship and Faraday's  cage, see
quotes in Healey [2009], pp. 698-699.
5 Or two qualitatively different realisations (note also valid for other 'some / no' cases).
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theoretical symmetry has the ontological DES with respect to it, and so will beg the question of
which theoretical  symmetry has DES. But  this  is  the question we want to answer after  having
identified  what  counts  as  an  empirical  symmetry,  not  before.  Therefore  not  only  should  it  be
possible to identify an empirical symmetry without any reference to theories (Kosso [2000], p. 85;
Healey [2009], p. 699), but it is necessary to do so in our context. If no other means of access to
unobservable  features  remains,  it  follows  that  identifiable  empirical  symmetries  are  precisely
empirical  symmetries  where  both  the  identical  features  and  the  constitutive  differences  are
observable. All the recognised empirical symmetries are of this kind.
This  rules  out  in  particular  empirical  symmetries  where  only  the  identical  features  are
observable (excluded by Kosso [2000] but admitted by Ladyman and Presnell [in submission]). It
might  seem  that  we  could  establish  the  unobservable  constitutive  differences  through  the
observability of the physical transformation, like in Ladyman and Presnell's example of a square tile
rotated by 90 degrees. There the process of performing the transformation is indeed observable, but
this is because the intermediary states by which it passes are observationally distinguishable from
the  initial  and  the  final  states  constituting  this  empirical  symmetry.  But  then  if  we  match  an
intermediary state with the initial or the final state, the constitutive differences will be observable
contrary to our presupposition; and if we match an intermediary state with its 90-degree rotated
state, the constitutive differences will again be unobservable and this will be of no help6; and if we
consider the initial and the final state together with an intermediary state, then this may help for the
first  way  of  realising  empirical  symmetries  but  not  for  the  second  way  because  there  are  no
intermediary states there. Moreover, this will not help in cases like Ladyman and Presnell's example
of  the  Michelson-Morley  experiment  where  for  any couple  of  states  the  presumed constitutive
differences of position with respect to the aether are unobservable7.
If we cannot identify empirical symmetries whose constitutive differences are unobservable,
we cannot establish a DES of those theoretical symmetries which would be best instantiated by, or
would best represent,  such empirical symmetries. Arguably the latter  theoretical symmetries are
those whose transformations do not induce any (non-trivial) observational consequences. But then
these are just gauge symmetries by one of the understandings of this term8. Hence no DES of such
gauge symmetries can be established, and this independently of whether their transformations are
local or global, external (i.e. spatiotemporal) or internal (i.e. non-spatiotemporal), independently of
whether gauge symmetries do have DES, and despite the possibility for us to put the identical
observational consequences of a gauge symmetry in correspondence with the observable identical
features of an empirical symmetry.
Thus DESs we have a hope to establish (identifiable DESs) should be those of non-gauge
symmetries. Moreover, given the argument against appeal to theories above, these DESs should
only rely on physical features and theoretical elements related to the level of observation. This
motivates  the  following  definitions  (which  both  do  not  make  appeal  to  features  and  elements
unrelated  to  observation):  A theoretical  symmetry  has  the  identifiable  observational  DES if  it
provides  an  adequate  representation  of  the  observable  constitutive  features  of  an  identifiable
empirical  symmetry  in  the  empirical  approach  or  if  the  observable  constitutive  features  of  an
identifiable  empirical  symmetry provide an adequate instantiation of  the theoretical  symmetry's
observational  consequences  in  the  theoretical  approach.  And  a  theoretical  symmetry  has  the
identifiable ontological DES if  moreover the same relationship holds between the unobservable
6 This shows that identifiability of an empirical symmetry depends on two states or on a state and a transformation,
not on a single state.
7 Ladyman and Presnell claim that this is not an empirical symmetry because theories say it is not, but if the argument
against appeal to theories above also holds for establishing what should not count as an empirical symmetry, we
should instead remain agnostic on whether this experiment is an empirical symmetry.
8 This is the understanding we adopt throughout the article. On another often used understanding, gauge symmetries
are local symmetries whose empirical status is unclear. These are simply called local symmetries below, and their
status is discussed in Section 7.
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underpinnings of these observable constitutive features and the theoretical underpinnings of these
observational  consequences.  This  corresponds  to  Ladyman  and  Presnell's  distinction  between
weaker 'logical' and stronger 'physical' consequences of theoretical symmetries, but is free of some
of its drawbacks9. We will be analysing these identifiable DESs of non-gauge symmetries until we
see how gauge symmetries can be useful in that context.
4. Theoretical symmetries with the identifiable observational DES
Even the most comprehensive analysis of DES so far by Greaves and Wallace ([2014]) does
not tell  which theoretical symmetries have the (identifiable) observational DES10.  They proceed
within the theoretical approach, by considering which theoretical symmetries are instantiated by
empirical symmetries, and obtain a list of theoretical symmetries corresponding to the recognised
empirical symmetries as a response (ibid., p. 87)11. Beforehand they divide theoretical symmetries
into  boundary-preserving  and  non-boundary-preserving  ones,  as  well  as  into  interior  and  non-
interior ones, so one expects their list to follow from their framework. But the first distinction is
orthogonal  to  the  question  of  which  symmetry  has  the  observational  DES,  for  both  boundary-
preserving and non-boundary-preserving symmetries figure in their list. Meanwhile, classifying a
symmetry as interior trivially implies the answer to that question, for by their definition interior
symmetries are those where both theoretical states describe the same possible world, and so they
cannot correspond to any empirical symmetry (ibid., p. 71); while classifying a symmetry as non-
interior does not generate the answer precisely enough, for some non-interior symmetries may fail
to  correspond  to  identifiable  empirical  symmetries  or  even  to  generalised  not  necessarily
identifiable empirical symmetries from Section 2.
I  will  show  how  to  determine  which  theoretical  symmetries  have  the  identifiable
observational DES using the empirical approach, a general knowledge about current physics and a
characterisation of a generic theoretical symmetry12.
We start from the empirical approach by asking what it takes to represent an identifiable
empirical symmetry. A general knowledge of physics tells us that observable features static within a
state  can  be  represented  either  by  static  values  of  variables  or  by  evolving  values  whose
observational consequences are static, while observable dynamical features can be represented by
evolving  values  whose  observational  consequences  evolve.  To  obtain  the  latter,  we  can  first
represent observable features of an initial  momentary physical state, i.e. the fraction of a physical
state  corresponding  to  the  moment  when  the  dynamics  begins,  using  an  initial  momentary
theoretical state, i.e. a set (or distribution) of certain values of suitable variables indexed by the
same value of a time variable, next generate a  history (i.e. a sequence of momentary theoretical
states for all other times) using differential equations of motion or field equations, and then restrict
that history to the period of time during which a non-trivial observable identical dynamics or a non-
trivial  dynamics  leading  to  identical  observable  static  features  occurs.  Alternatively,  besides
specifying an initial momentary theoretical state we can also specify a final momentary theoretical
state corresponding to the last moment of the non-trivial dynamics in question, then determine the
variation  along  which  path (i.e. a  restricted  sequence  of  momentary  states)  between  the  two
momentary theoretical states extremises an action, and choose either that path in the classical case,
9 Namely, here both approaches rather than the theoretical approach alone are clearly taken into account, and the
theoretical and the physical level are clearly distinguished while Ladyman and Presnell's distinction suggests they
are mixed if the idea that theoretical symmetries have physical consequences is taken seriously.
10 I take them to examine this question because Ladyman and Presnell ([in submission]) say Wallace confirms dealing
with weaker 'logical' rather than stronger 'physical' consequences in that article.
11 To which for completeness global symmetries corresponding to 't Hooft's beam-splitter must be added from Brading
and Brown ([2004]).
12 This is a theoretical approach in that a knowledge of physics is used, but not the theoretical approach as defined
above.
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or a combination of paths contributing proportionally to their proximity to the classical path in the
quantum  case.  Thus  a  representation  of  a  physical  state,  which  we  will  name  a(n  extended)
theoretical  state,  will  be a sequence of momentary theoretical  states  comprising a  theoretically
static  or  dynamical  representation  of  observably  static  features  and  a  theoretically  dynamical
representation of observable dynamical features.
As to the physical transformation, its occurrence is accidental to the way of instantiating
empirical symmetries, and the details of bringing about this transformation are accidental to the
particular  instantiations  within  the  first  way.  Moreover,  representing  e.g. how  one  decided  to
physically boost a ship, if possible at all, may require going beyond physics. So we only need to
represent a possibility of a physical transformation, and this can be done using a  non-dynamical
(i.e. without intermediary stages) theoretical transformation which resumes or brings about all the
differences between the initial and the final theoretical states (representing respectively the initial
and the final physical states), and which we will name  the main transformation to distinguish it
from the infinitesimal dynamical theoretical transformations which can be used to generate a single
(momentary or extended) theoretical state.
A particular representation of a realisation of an identifiable empirical symmetry will thus
consist of two particular theoretical states linked by a particular main transformation. In virtue of
representing the physical states of an identifiable empirical symmetry these theoretical states will
have to share some but not all of their observational consequences besides possibly sharing some
theoretical elements as well. Now a generic theoretical symmetry consists of two partially identical
theoretical constructions and a theoretical transformation between them13. Therefore, under a natural
identification of the theoretical states with 'constructions' and of the main transformation with the
transformation linking those constructions, a representation of an identifiable empirical symmetry
we have built is precisely a non-trivial theoretical symmetry with the identifiable observational DES
in the empirical approach.
5. Global and local transformations and states
The  literature  on  DES  has  concentrated  on  whether  a  DES  of  a  theoretical  symmetry
depends on the global or local character of its (restricted) main transformation. But as explained
above the main transformation only has to resume the differences between the theoretical states
because of the accidental character of much there is in the physical transformation. So most of the
identifiable observational DES has to be ensured by the theoretical states. To keep the possibility for
the global/local distinction to be important in this context, I am therefore going to extend it to states
by  analysing  how  it  applies  to  transformations,  supposing  both  states  and  transformations  are
already specified.
There are three usual ways of dividing given transformations into global and local. Firstly, a
continuous group of transformations is global or local according to whether it depends on a finite
number  of  parameters  or  functions  respectively.  Secondly,  a  transformation  is  global  or  local
according to whether it is specified using a finite number of parameters or functions respectively.
Thirdly, a transformation is global or local according to whether its prescriptions of change in value
vary within its domain of application.
From these the first  definition is mostly used in mathematics (from which the notion of
group comes as well) and the other two are used as equivalent in the literature on DES. I will not
use the second definition, because if it is an attempt to particularise the first in view of applying it to
physics, the justification in our context is not self-evident, and it is not equivalent to the third either.
Indeed,  a  transformation  global  by  the  third  definition  can  be  global  or  local  by  the  second
definition,  i.e. described using a  parameter  or a  function (which can be constant  or  not  on the
13 A transformation alone is not enough because there should also be something it preserves (for this to be a symmetry)
and something it changes (for the symmetry to be non-trivial).
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relevant domain). Conversely, a transformation local by the second definition can be global or local
by the third definition. Both issues arise because variables concerned by the two definitions are
different.  E.g. in  the  (restricted)  theoretical  symmetry  ψ0 →  ψ1 =  ψ0exp(iqθ),  where  the  phase
transformation ·exp(iqθ) can represent the change in the constitutive differences of 't Hooft's beam-
splitter empirical symmetry, the second definition concerns θ and the third ·exp(iqθ), i.e. the change
in the phase ψ. But it is the latter quantity that represents the change in the constitutive differences.
So what matters primarily is whether the change in  ψ varies within the domain, not whether the
change in θ varies within the domain. Therefore the third definition will be used.
 Thus  a  given  theoretical  transformation is  global or  local with  respect  to  a  variable
depending on whether the prescriptions of change in value of that variable are the same for all items
or different for at least two items within the initial domain. Therefore, the most straightforward
extension to states is to say that a given theoretical state is global or local with respect to a variable
depending on whether the values of that variable are same for all items or different for at least two
items within the initial domain.
Arguments in favour of this way of defining the extension to states are as follows.
Firstly, in this case the only difference between the distinctions, and perfectly natural, is that
the distinction for transformations is about prescriptions of change in value while the distinction for
states is about values.
Secondly,  the  latter  distinction  needs  the  same  precondition  for  being  well-defined
(i.e. allowing  either  option  to  be  realised)  as  the  former,  namely  that  the  domain  be  always
composed  of  several  items.  Indeed,  if  the  domain  is  composed  of  a  single  item,  a  state  or
transformation will always be global, either trivially or after we will have reinterpreted the domain
as composed of several parts of the original item to each of which the same value or change in value
is attributed. E.g. the (restricted) theoretical symmetry v0 → v1 = v0 + v' capable of representing the
constitutive differences of Galileo's ship empirical symmetry, usually considered as involving two
values of velocity v0 and v1 assigned each to a whole Galileo's ship as well as a single change in
value +v' between them, thus comes out either way as global in the main transformation and in the
states with respect to velocity.
Thirdly, the global or local character of given states and transformations can be determined
using the same tool, namely a function which evaluates how values or changes in value differ for
two items14. The conditions for having a global or a local character according to this tool will again
be similar for states and transformations, namely, given the adopted definitions of the global/local
distinction for states and transformations,  a theoretical state or transformation will be  global or
local according to whether the difference in value or in change in value as evaluated by the function
respectively is or is not zero for respectively any or at least some two items within the domain. Also
if  the  function  fails  to  be  well-determined,  this  will  affect  the  characterisation  of  states  and
transformations alike. If it only fails to give a unique evaluation for two distant items from the same
domain, as is common in particular to many general-relativistic topologies, restricting the function
to comparisons to neighbouring items, i.e. making it a kind of derivative on the domain, can help to
determine the character of both states and transformations.
An already specified main theoretical transformation can be interpreted  more actively (as
representing a production of physical change of a physical state) or more passively (as resuming a
difference between two physical states) depending on whether we match it with instantiations of an
empirical symmetry where physical transformations are present or those where they are absent15.
Above I only took the more active sense, but the same discussion could be made for the more
passive sense, with global and local defined as above except that items go into couples of items, the
initial  domain  into  the  initial  and  the  final  domain,  and  prescriptions  of  change  in  value  into
differences between values.
14 While the function in the second definition above concerned variables like θ, this function concerns variables like ψ.
15 Both these senses are active with respect to the passive sense from Section 7.
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6. Properly global and properly local theoretical symmetries
To  establish  a  correspondence  between  the  identical  features  and  suitable  theoretical
elements we could use a single physical state and so no DES would arise. It is for establishing a
correspondence between (the change in) the constitutive differences and other suitable theoretical
elements that we need an empirical symmetry and a theoretical symmetry, whence a DES16. Thus a
DES  of  a  theoretical  symmetry  is  primarily  a  property  of  its  restricted  theoretical  symmetry
constituted by those theoretical elements corresponding to the observable constitutive differences,
together with that part of the main transformation which corresponds to the difference between
these elements in the two theoretical states. We will  therefore be concentrating on the DES of
restricted theoretical symmetries for the rest of the article17.
Examples of restricted theoretical symmetries mentioned in Section 5 are v0 → v1 = v0 + v'
and ψ0 → ψ1 = ψ0exp(iqθ). Here v0 and ψ0 are restricted initial theoretical states, +v' and ·exp(iqθ)
restricted  main  transformations,  v1 and  ψ1 restricted  final  theoretical  states.  These  symmetries
involve velocity (v) and phase (ψ) variables respectively, and can represent (be instantiated by) the
constitutive differences and the change in them respectively in Galileo's ship and 't Hooft's beam-
splitter  empirical  symmetries (the latter  usually when supplemented with a restricted symmetry
involving  the  electromagnetic  potential  variable).  For  Faraday's  cage,  restricted  symmetries
involving electrostatic or electromagnetic potentials have been evoked in the literature on DES, and
for Einstein's elevator, restricted symmetries involving acceleration and gravitational potentials.
In our context a theoretical symmetry is qualified as global or local according to whether its
restricted main transformation is global or local. As many authors as Kosso ([2000]), Brading and
Brown ([2004]), Healey ([2009]), Friederich ([2015]), and Ladyman and Presnell ([in submission])
can be taken to claim that only symmetries global in that sense have the ontological DES. But given
the importance of the states explained above, admitting that a symmetry with the ontological DES
global  in  the  restricted  main  transformation  can  be  local  in  the  restricted  states  seems  to
significantly weaken this view. Therefore, if we say that theoretical symmetries are properly global
or  properly local according to whether  both the restricted main transformation and the restricted
theoretical states are respectively global or local, the strongest version of the common view will be
the claim that only properly global symmetries have the ontological DES.
I think that within the empirical approach the strengthened common view can be supported
by the following pragmatic motivation. It is a fact that any realisation of a recognised empirical
symmetry yields the observational DES to an infinity of theoretical symmetries (call them  DES-
equivalent). E.g. two Galileo's ships uniformly moving at a definite observable pace with respect to
each other can be represented by an infinity of pairs (v0,v1) such that velocities in each pair differ by
the  same  v'.  Usually  DES-equivalent  theoretical  symmetries  have  the  same  observational
consequences, and so empirical adequacy, and do not differ significantly in theoretical virtues such
as simplicity. A common strategy for extracting ontology in such cases is to hold as ontologically
faithful what all the theoretical descriptions agree on. But this gives a very poor ontology if applied
to only local or to both global and local DES-equivalent symmetries because these do not have
much in common. For example, properly global and properly local symmetries obviously disagree
on the global or local character of states and transformations, let alone on particular values and their
particular changes and/or differences, while local DES-equivalent symmetries disagree for instance
on whether Faraday's cage or its exterior alone is transformed (Healey [2009], appendix B, gives an
example  of  the  latter  representation).  Meanwhile,  properly  global  DES-equivalent  symmetries
disagree on the absolute values of the variable(s) subject to transformation, but agree numerically
16 More precisely, DES also involves a correspondence between the compatibility of the identical features with either
of the constitutive differences and the compatibility between the theoretical elements put in correspondence to them.
17 Even when we will be considering unrestricted symmetries in Section 7.
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on the transformation besides agreeing on the global character of both the transformation and the
states. Abstracting away the absolute values from DES-equivalent properly global symmetries is
thus sufficient to get a rather rich ontology with respect to the other options18. This pragmatically
motivates the attribution of the ontological DES to properly global symmetries alone, as well as the
ontological importance of the main transformation over the theoretical states it links.
However, if ontology is to be understood in objective rather than pragmatic way, additional
motivation independent of pragmatic considerations has to be provided. But motivations from the
early literature on DES are often elliptic or unclear, need to be updated in light of recent articles
(such as Greaves and Wallace [2014] and Teh [2016]) and concern particular cases, by which reason
they require going into technical and other details and are not easily generalisable. So instead of
discussing  them,  I  will  concentrate  on  one  general  and  easy-to-understand  non-pragmatic
motivation  which has  persisted  throughout  the debate.  This  is  the  idea,  also arising within the
empirical approach, that identifiable empirical symmetries often yield the identifiable observational
DES to (properly) global symmetries alone.
Already  Kosso's  main  claim  is  that  “global  symmetries  … are,  in  an  important  sense,
directly observed, while local symmetries … are not” ([2000], p. 81), where the relevant sense is a
correspondence between an identifiable empirical ('physical') symmetry, possibly established prior
to any theories, and a theoretical ('analytic') symmetry (ibid., p. 85)19. However, later on Brading
and  Brown ([2004])  and  Healey  ([2009])  show respectively  of  't  Hooft's  beam-splitter  and  of
Faraday's  cage empirical  symmetries  that  they yield the identifiable  observational  DES to both
global  and  local  symmetries.  Still,  when  Greaves  and  Wallace  introduce  Einstein's  elevator
empirical  symmetry  into  discussion,  they  only  exhibit  global  (although  not  properly  global)
symmetries  capable  of  representing  its  observable  constitutive  differences  ([2014],  eq. 11).
Furthermore,  despite  suggestions  by  Greaves  and  Wallace  ([2014],  p. 63,  n. 4)  and  Friederich
([2015], p. 556) no-one has exhibited local or properly local symmetries capable of representing the
observable constitutive differences of Galileo's ship empirical symmetry yet, so it continues to be
represented by restricted symmetries like the one involving velocity above, which is properly global
as argued in Section 5. The upshot is that so far two out of four recognised empirical symmetries
still bestow the identifiable observational DES on (properly) global symmetries alone.
An argument for the view that properly local symmetries do not have the ontological DES
can then be easily constructed as follows. It is plausible (given the current situation, and perhaps by
other reasons as well) that while some empirical symmetries bestow the identifiable observational
DES on both global and local symmetries, other empirical symmetries bestow this DES on global
symmetries alone in the sense that their observable constitutive differences can only be represented
by  properly  global  symmetries  or  at  least  by  global  symmetries,  but  not  by  properly  local
symmetries. Then in the case of the latter empirical symmetries only (properly) global symmetries
will have the  identifiable  ontological DES because there will be no properly local symmetries to
consider. But to remain consistent, we have to build our ontology in the same way whatever the
empirical symmetry. Hence, the argument would go, likewise in the case of the former empirical
symmetries  properly  local  symmetries  cannot  have  the  identifiable  ontological  DES.  In  short,
(properly)  global  but  not  properly  local  symmetries  would  have  to  always  get  the  identifiable
ontological  DES because  of  them having the  identifiable observational  DES with  respect  to  a
greater number of empirical symmetries.
 To address this argument, exhibiting properly local symmetries representing the observable
constitutive differences of the two recognised empirical symmetries above would be useful not be
enough, for the worry would still remain of discovering new empirical symmetries which bestow
the  identifiable  observational  DES  on  (properly)  global  symmetries  alone.  Instead,  its  crucial
18 Obviously allowing global symmetries not to be properly global removes the agreement on the character of the
states and makes the ontology poorer.
19 Whether he is concerned with the observational or the ontological DES is unclear.
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assumption that some empirical symmetries yield the identifiable observational DES to (properly)
global symmetries alone will be challenged in the next section in a way which does not depend on
details of particular theories or identifiable empirical symmetries.
7. The proof
I am going to prove that from an unrestricted properly global theoretical symmetry which
has  the  identifiable  observational  DES  in  virtue  of  adequately  representing  the  observable
constitutive features of a realisation of an identifiable empirical symmetry, an unrestricted properly
local  theoretical  symmetry  with  the  same  status  with  respect  to  the  same  realisation  of  the
identifiable  empirical  symmetry  can  always  be  constructed  using  suitable  gauge  symmetries,
i.e. those theoretical symmetries which do not induce any change in observational consequences.
The recipe is as follows:
(1) construct new theoretical states and ensure they are observationally equivalent to the
original states;
(2) ensure the new states are local in all the variables relevant for the representation of the
observable constitutive differences;
(3) construct a theoretical transformation between these local states;
(4) ensure this transformation is local in all the variables relevant for the representation of
the observable constitutive differences.
All this will be done using requirements on gauge transformations (and using the I defined
below).
The notation  in  the  proof  is  as  follows.  In  the  original  theoretical  symmetry  the  initial
theoretical state is labelled by S0, the main transformation by T, the final theoretical state by S1. The
common part of the two states is denoted by S. In the resulting theoretical symmetry the same labels
with a prime are used. The (gauge) transformation linking S0 and S0' is labelled by T0, the (gauge)
transformation linking S1 and S1' is labelled by T1. After all these labels, variables acted on by a
transformation or involved in a state can be indicated in brackets. Variables (or a single variable) are
denoted by A if they are acted on by the restricted main transformation, by B if they are acted on by
the unrestricted but not restricted main transformation, by C if they are involved in the states but are
not acted on by the main transformation, and by N if they are not involved neither in the main
transformation nor in the states prior to introducing the gauge transformations. These letters are
unprimed or primed depending of whether the involvement is with respect to the states and the
transformation of the original or the resulting symmetry. Unspecified variables are denoted by X,
while I stands for values of variables ensuring the individuation of the items for the state of which
these values make part.
In this  notation our task reads as follows: starting with a theoretical symmetry with the
identifiable observational DES whose restricted symmetry is constituted by S0(A), T(A), S1(A) all
global in A, we should arrive at another theoretical symmetry with the identifiable observational
DES whose restricted symmetry is constituted by S0'(X), T'(X), S1'(X) all local in X. I am going to
obtain this using gauge transformations T0, T1 as depicted in Figure 1.
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(1) We firstly need gauge transformations T0, T1. One option is to construct T0 and T1 using
the  first  approach to  constructing  transformations,  which  consists  in  attaching  prescriptions  of
change in value of some variable to the items which belong to the initial domain, i.e. to the domain
of S0 for T0 and of S1 for T1. That T0, T1 are not given in advance implies in particular that a theory
used to build to the original symmetry does not tell us anything about the observational impact of
T0, T1. Therefore we can always impose as a requirement that these transformations do not induce
any change in observational consequences when applied to respectively S0 and S1.
Alternatively, we can use gauge transformations already given by a theory used to build the
original  symmetry  or  by  another  theory.  This  option  may  seem to  imply  that  a  properly  local
symmetry  that  we  wish  to  construct  is  already  given  too.  However,  if  T0,  T1 are  given  as
prescriptions of change on the domains of S0, S1, then S0', S1' are still not given until we apply T0, T1
to S0, S1, i.e. until we apply to a value associated by a state to a given item a prescription of change
in value associated by a transformation to that item. Moreover, neither giving T0, T1 nor applying
them to S0, S1 may be sufficient to define T'. For even though we will presuppose that the domains
of S0, S1, S0', S1' have the same cardinality, a way of defining T' can be non-unique (see (3) below)
and then T' will not be defined until a choice is made. Besides, not all T0, T1 lead to properly local
symmetries, otherwise we would not need all the requirements on them specified below.
Next, as a given or constructed T0 is gauge when applied to S0, the resulting state S0' is
observationally equivalent to S0, and likewise the state S1' resulting from the application of T1 to S1
is observationally equivalent to S1. Thus S0' represents the initial physical state as good as S0 does,
and likewise for S1' as compared to S1. Moreover, S0 and S1 are distinct observationally inequivalent
states, for otherwise the same theoretical state would be allowed to represent two observationally
distinct  physical  states,  and  this  would  contradict  the  assumption  (implied  by  the  identifiable
observational  DES)  that  the  observable  constitutive  differences  are  adequately  represented.
Therefore S0' and S1' are distinct observationally inequivalent states, and if they can be linked by a
main transformation, it will be non-trivial and will have to bring the difference in the observational
consequences  of  these  states,  which  will  be  the  same  as  the  difference  in  the  observational
consequences brought by T.
(2) The variables relevant to the representation of the observable constitutive differences in
S0' and/or S1' are those the action of T0 or T1 on which in S0 and S1, coupled to a non-trivial action of
T0 or T1 on A, is sufficient to make S0' and S1' observationally equivalent to respectively S0 and S1 as
far as the representation of the observable constitutive differences is concerned. Both S0' and S1'
should be local in all  the relevant variables including A (which can comprise A alone or more
variables), or both should be both local in all the relevant variables and zero in A (which then is not
a relevant variable strictly speaking). E.g. quantum mechanics says that passing from a state global
in phase to a state local in phase changes the prediction of the interference pattern in 't Hooft's
beam-splitter, but a theory coupling quantum particles with classical electromagnetic fields gives
gauge transformations allowing to restore the original prediction by making the state also local in
electromagnetic potential (Brading and Brown [2004], p. 654). Here the phase corresponds to A and
the potential to N. To act on a new variable N one presupposes that it characterised the initial state
but was zero across it.  To ensure that the DES of the original symmetry does not derive from
(changes in) values of N, we can thus impose that if N are acted on by at least one of T0 and T1, N
have value zero across both S0 and S1 and are unaffected by T. For completeness we will suppose
that the relevant variables can be among any of A, B, C and N.
If the action of T0, T1 on the relevant variables makes S0', S1' incompatible with the way
other features are represented in S0, S1, then T0, T1 can additionally act on the theoretical elements
accounting for the latter features to make S0' and S1' observationally equivalent to respectively S0
and S1 as far as the representation of these features is concerned. However, S0 and S1 need not be
local in these theoretical elements. E.g. in Brading and Brown's example introducing the potential
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requires changing the Lagrangian or the equations  for generating the dynamics ([2004],  eq. 1.7
instead of eq. 1.1)20.
To make S0', S1' local in the relevant variables, recall that being global means attaching the
same (change  in)  value  to  each  item within  the  domain  of  application  and being local  means
attaching a different (change in) value to different items within the domain. It follows that, within
the  domain  of  application  of  the  transformation  in  the  first  approach  and  with  respect  to  the
variable(s) acted on by it, /1/ a global transformation applied to a global state always yields a global
state;  /2/  a global transformation applied to a local state always yields a local state; /3/ a local
transformation  applied  to  a  local  state  can  yield  a  local  or  a  global  state;  and  /4/  a  local
transformation applied to a global state always yields a local state.
Therefore, /1/ allows to put values of A to zero by requiring that T0(A) and T1(A) be certain
global transformations. Meanwhile, for making S0', S1' local in B and C in which S0, S1 are local,
either we should require using /2/ that T0, T1 be global, or using /3/ we should require that T0, T1 be
local and exclude the possibility in this context for S0', S1' to be global. For this, as T0, T1 are given
or have been already constructed, we can simply check different S0', S1' obtained using different
local T0, T1 and only retain those local T0, T1 which yield local S0', S1'. Or else we can require for
this that T0, T1 be identity on some subset of items of S0, S1. Finally, /4/ allows to make S0', S1' local
in A and N, as well as in B and C in which S0, S1 are global, by requiring that T0, T1 be local in these
variables.
For T0 or T1 to be local, this transformation should associate different amounts of change to
different items characterised by S0 or S1, and this means that these items should be distinguishable
beforehand. To ensure this we will presuppose that S0 and S1 include or are supplemented with the
individuating distributions of values I  allowing to distinguish between the items. E.g. values of
spatiotemporal variables can be used because within any given coordinate frame any two items
always get associated to them different sets of values of these variables. Of course, associations
between sets of values and items vary with coordinate frames, so distinct coordinate frames can
associate the same set of values to distinct items. Thus S0 and S1 can share the same I (as part of C)
e.g. because  they  represent  objects  participating  in  the  interior  dynamics  within  two  systems
(e.g. Galileo's  ships or 't  Hooft's  beam-splitters)  as having the same locations in the coordinate
frames defined by the observers of these systems.
(3) As by now S0' and S1' have already been obtained, we can use the second approach to
constructing transformations and define T' as a difference, for any variable by values of which S0'
and S1' differ, between a given initial value and a given final value of that variable. Which variables
T' acts upon is determined by a strong key fact by which T' should be equivalent to the combination
of the reverse of T0 followed by T and T1 in  case T0 is  reversible,  given that  both T'  and the
combination just mentioned should lead from the same S0' to the same S1', or at least by a weak key
fact by which the combination of T0 and T' should be equivalent to the combination of T and T1
given that both combinations should lead from the same S0 to the same S1'. Either fact means T'
should only act on those variables which are needed to make the square commute. E.g. if T0(N) and
T1(N) are identical,  T'(N) is identity, and if  neither of T,  T0 and T1 act on C, nor can T'.  Thus
variables on which T' does not act (denoted by C') and variables on which T' acts (denoted by
A'&B') are those whose change by T' is respectively incompatible or compatible with one of the key
facts.
 We need not have I in S0' and S1' to define T', but their presence together with the key facts
determines whether T' is defined uniquely. Firstly, if there are I among the values of C' (e.g.  if the
same I are incorporated in S0 and S1 (as part of C) and if T0, T1 preserve these I), T' is unique.
Secondly, if C' do not provide I and A'&B' do but only for one of S0'  and S1',  then some items
characterised  by  the  same values  of  C'  will  be  distinguishable  in  one  state  because  of  having
different values of A'&B' and indistinguishable in another state because of having the same values
20 More exactly one would need to change them in the original symmetry too similarly to how one introduced N there.
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of  A'&B'.  In  this  case  T'  preserving  C'  is  seemingly  underdetermined  as  to  which  of  the
distinguishable items should be matched with which of the indistinguishable items. But due to the
indistinguishability  of  the  items  the  matching  options  are  indistinguishable  too,  hence  no  real
underdetermination arises. Thirdly, the same holds if neither C' nor A'&B' provide I for either of S0'
and S1', i.e. when indistinguishable items are matched. Fourthly, if C' does not provide I and A'&B'
do  for  either  of  S0'  and  S1',  then  T'  is  indeed  underdetermined  because  there  are  several
distinguishable ways of matching the distinguishable items of the two domains (or, more precisely,
of matching values of A'&B' associated to these items) even if C' is required to be preserved given
the key facts.  This  underdetermination is  however  not  a  problem provided among the ways of
defining T' we can single out those which make it local in the relevant variables.
(4) We deduce from /1/-/4/ that /1'/ two global states can be linked by an identity or a global
transformation,  /2'/  two  local  states  can  be  linked  by  an  identity  or  a  global  or  a  local
transformation, /3'/ a global state and a local state can only be linked by a local transformation. So
by /2'/  T'  is  not automatically local in  all  the relevant  variables  in which S0'  and S1'  are local.
Moreover, in the third case above T' limited to the matchings of indistinguishable items (states
global in C' and in A'&B') cannot be local by /1'/, although the whole T' can still be local. On the
other hand, in the second case above T' limited to the matchings of indistinguishable items with
distinguishable items (the latter state global in C' and local in A'&B') is necessarily local by /3'/, and
hence the whole T' is necessarily local. So one way of making T' local is to ensure that the second
case obtains. E.g. if S0, S1 have the same I (as part of C), we can make T0, T1 both act on C to alter
the same value (or the same set of values) of I into another value among those used in I, while we
make say T0(A,N) identity and T1(A,N) local on the items whose values are concerned, and both
T0(A,N) and T1(A,N) local on the other items. (That local transformations act on I needed to define
them is not a problem.) However, this hardly suits for I such as values of spatiotemporal variables,
so I will also describe another way of ensuring T' is local which it suitable for them too.
Namely, it follows from our definition of global and local transformations above that if one
transformation is equivalent to the combination of a second and a third transformation, then /1''/ if
from first  and  the  second  transformations,  or  from the  second  and  the  third,  both  are  global,
respectively the third or the first is either identity or another global transformation; /2''/ if from the
first and the second transformations, or from the second and the third, one is global and the other
local, respectively the third or the first is another local transformation; /3''/ if the first and the second
transformations  are  local,  the  third  is  identity  or  global  or  local.  Therefore  we  can  make  a
transformation global or local by considering it as part of a triangle of transformations where the
global or local character of the other transformations is suitably chosen.
A triangle is available directly for variables not acted on by T, i.e. C and N, for which by a
reduced weak key fact T1 is equivalent to the combination of T0 and T' (Figure 2). For A and B we
can transform our square into two triangles.  For this  we define T'':  S0 → S1'  using the second
approach and determine the variables T'' acts upon using another reduced weak key fact by which
T'' is equivalent to the combination of T and T1. T'' also gets involved in a third reduced weak key
fact by which T'' is equivalent to the combination of T0 and T' (Figure 3).
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The character of T' can then be determined given that in both triangles where it is present, it
is the third transformation from the rules /1''/-/3''/ above. Thus in general T' can be made local via
/2''/, or via /3''/ e.g. if the other two transformations are required to be non-identical on their domain
(which precludes the third transformation from being identical) but identical on some restriction of
their  domain  (which  precludes  the  third  transformation  from  being  global).  However,  not  all
solutions suit for particular variables.
T'(A) cannot be made local via /2''/, for if T0(A) is global and T''(A) local, by /2''/ T1(A)
should be local and so S0' will be zero in A while S1' local in A contrary to (2); and if T0(A) is local
and T''(A) is global, by /1''/ T1(A) should be global and so S0' will be local in A while S1' zero in A
contrary to (2). Thus T'(A) should be made local by choosing a local T1(A), which by /2''/ makes
T''(A) local, and a local T0(A), which allows to use /3''/ provided the requirements for /3''/ above are
satisfied, i.e. provided we require that T0(A) be different from T''(A) except for some subdomain of
S0.
Similarly, T'(N) or T'(C) with global S(C) cannot be made local via /2''/, for if one of T0 and
T1 is global in C or N and another local in C or N, by /1/ one of S0' and S1' will be global in C or N
and by /4/ the other of S0' and S1' will be local in C or N contrary to (2). Thus T'(N) or T'(C) with
global S(C) should be made local via /3''/  by choosing both T0 and T1 local in N or C and by
imposing on them the requirements for /3''/ above.
Also T'(C) with local S(C) can be made local via /3''/ as just described provided we ensure
that S0'(C) and S1'(C) are local. It is fortunate that one of the ways of ensuring this proposed in (2),
namely to require that T0(C) and T1(C) be identity on a subdomain of S, implies (if for T0(C) and
T1(C) the same subdomain is concerned) that these transformations are identical on this subdomain
and so allows to satisfy the requirements for /3''/ at the same time. Besides, T'(C) with local S(C)
can be made local via /2''/ by choosing one of T0(C) and T1(C) to be global and another local while
ensuring, e.g. as proposed in (2), that the state resulting from the action of the latter transformation
is local in C.
Finally, if S0(B), T(B), S1(B) are all global, T'(B) can be made local exactly as it was done
with T'(A). While if S0(B) is global and S1(B) is local, and hence T(B) local by /3'/, we can choose
T1(B) to be global, which makes T''(B) local by /2''/, then choose T1(B)** to be local and use /3''/ and
the requirements above, i.e. require that T0(B) be different from T''(B) except for some subdomain
of S0. Meanwhile, if S0(B) is local and S1(B) is global, and hence T(B) local by /3'/, we can choose
T1(B) to be local and use /3''/ and the requirements above, i.e. require that T1(B) be different from
T''(B) except for some subdomain of S1, then choose T1(B)*** to be global and use /2''/. Finally, if
S0(B), T(B), S1(B) are all local, we can choose T1(B) global, which makes T''(B) local by /2''/, and
choose T0(B) global, which makes T'(B) local by /2''/.
This concludes the proof.
** This should have been “T0(B)”.
*** This should have been “except for some subdomain of S1 and some subdomain of S0 which share the same I, then
choose T0(B)”.
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Example  (adapted  from  Healey  [2009],  Appendix  B):  The  observable  constitutive
differences of Faraday's cage empirical symmetry are represented by a properly global symmetry φ0
= 0 → φ1 = φ0 + φ' ≠ 0 with φ the electrostatic potential. T1 sets φ1 to 0 and acts on the magnetic
potential Ax as follows: Ax0 = 0 → Ax1 = (φ0 / a)t where  a is a distance from the cage's exterior
borders at which sparkles are no longer observed. In our notation φ is A and Ax is N. T1 and S1' are
local in Ax. T'' is identical to T1(Ax). We expect a properly local symmetry to arise if T0 is local in
our sense. Perhaps this T0 is the usual gauge transformation (Healey [2009], p. 718, eq. 2) with a
suitable choice of function Λ.
Some consequences of the proof are as follows. Firstly, the same theoretical state (S0) can
give rise to a theoretical symmetry with an identifiable DES (S0, T, S1) and to a gauge symmetry (S0,
T0, S0'). Thus which of these kinds a theoretical symmetry belongs to is determined by a couple of
states  or  by  a  state  and  a  transformation  rather  than  a  single  state.  This  parallels  the  way an
empirical symmetry happens to be identifiable or non-identifiable (Section 3 n. 6). Secondly, gauge
symmetries (including local ones) are not irrelevant to DES, contrary to the usual belief supported
even by those who attribute a DES to some local symmetries (Greaves and Wallace [2014], p. 87;
Teh [2016], p. 116). For gauge symmetries can produce properly local (S0', T', S1') and mixed (S0,
T'', S1') symmetries with the identifiable observational DES from properly global ones, and we can
expect them to link other combinations of symmetries too. Thirdly, the ontological status of gauge
symmetries  can  affect  the  status  of  symmetries  with  the  identifiable  observational  DES.  In
particular,  if  each of the gauge symmetries  (S0,  T0,  S0'  and S1,  T1,  S1')  is  interpreted  passively,
i.e. with  the  two  theoretical  states  redescribing  the  same  physical  state  and  the  theoretical
transformation  describing  a  passage  between  these  redescriptions,  then  the  three  theoretical
symmetries (S0, T, S1 and S0', T', S1' and S0, T'', S1') have the identifiable observational DES with
respect to the same realisation of the same empirical symmetry and cannot all have the ontological
DES with respect to it. Meanwhile, if each of the gauge symmetries is interpreted actively, i.e. with
each of the two theoretical states describing a different physical state (such that the two physical
states are observationally indistinguishable) and the theoretical transformation describing a passage
between the two physical states (whether interpreted more actively or more passively in the sense of
Section  5),  then  the  three  theoretical  symmetries  have  the  identifiable  observational  DES with
respect  to  either  of  the  physically  distinct  observationally  indistinguishable  realisations  of  the
empirical symmetry so obtained and more than one of these theoretical symmetries can have the
ontological  DES with  respect  to  one  (but  normally  not  the  same)  of  these  realisations  of  the
empirical symmetry. Finally, if only one of the gauge symmetries (e.g. T1) is interpreted actively,
the two realisations of the empirical symmetry share one of the physical states, and so at most one
of the theoretical states (S0 and S0') should be able to represent the unobservable underpinnings of
that state, but again more than one theoretical symmetry can have the ontological DES.
8. Conclusion
A number of new interrelated results have been presented: a general account of empirical
symmetries, a discussion of their identifiability, a demonstration of why gauge symmetries do not
have an identifiable DES, two notions of identifiable DES, a description of a theoretical symmetry
with  the  identifiable  observational  DES,  a  demonstration  in  this  context  of  how the  empirical
approach is more useful than the current version of the theoretical approach, an extension of the
global/local distinction to theoretical states, a motivation for concentrating on reduced theoretical
symmetries, a pragmatic and a non-pragmatic argument within the empirical approach on why only
properly global symmetries have the identifiable ontological DES, a refutation of the non-pragmatic
argument by the proof that from a properly global symmetry with the identifiable observational
DES a properly local symmetry with the same DES can always be constructed, and a demonstration
via the same proof of how gauge symmetries are useful for the analysis of DES. The upshot is that
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so far properly local symmetries should be considered as having at least as much chances for the
identifiable ontological DES as properly global symmetries do.
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